7. As will be illuminated in the subsequent sections, the Kadi and Nada decisions both resulted in the favoring of human rights above UNSC obligations, while applying very different reasoning. Both sets of reasoning are bound to be very influential, as they involved two of Europe's most powerful and prestigious courts. Whereas the ECtHR informs the jurisprudence of 47 states that constitute the membership of the Council of Europe, the CJEU impacts the legal developments in 27 states which make up the EU. Moreover, all 27 EU member states (two of which are permanent members of the UNSC) are also members of the Council of Europe and therefore need to take into consideration the jurisprudence of both the ECtHR and the CJEU. In addition, these two courts have often in the past influenced the jurisprudence of other domestic courts around the world. The importance of their reasoning in the Kadi and Nada decisions for the efficacy of UNSC sanctions regimes therefore is self-evident and justifies closer scrutiny. 12 court considered Mr. Kadi's listing to be immune from judicial scrutiny, as it originated from a binding UNSC sanctions regime that left no discretion for implementation. 17 From there Mr. Kadi launched a successful appeal (hereinafter referred to as Kadi CJEU I) to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). 18 The CJEU formally separated the implementing measures at EU level from the measures taken by the UNSC and the Al Qaida sanctions committee. It applied a dualist approach in as far as it engaged in review of the implementing measures, without formally challenging the primacy of the UNSC measures at the international level. 19 This formal separation was motivated by the fact that within the EU legal order fundamental rights (such as the right to judicial protection), formed an integral part of the general and constitutional order which could not be sacrificed. 20 The CJEU then ordered the implementing measures to be annulled, due to the fact that the EU authorities did not communicate any reasons to Mr. Kadi regarding his listing, nor had they afforded him any opportunity to be heard. 21 9. Subsequently the EU provided Mr. Kadi with a summary of reasons that has been made available by the Al Qaida sanctions committee and allowed him a hearing, but only to dismiss his response and reinstate the sanctions on the EU level. 22 Mr. Kadi once again turned to the the General Court whichfollowing the line of reasoning of the CJEU -determined that the reasons forwarded to Mr. Kadi were too vague to allow for meaningful review. The measures implementing the UNSC sanctions at EU level were therefore once again struck down. 23 10. This decision gave rise to another appeal to the CJEU, this time by the European Commission and Council of the EU and which was decided on 18 July 2013. 24 Supported by several EU member states, the appellants urged the CJEU to reconsider its position that judicial immunity should not be granted to EU listings that give effect to the Al Qaida sanctions regime. According to this line of argument, the EU was under a strict obligation to give effect to these obligations and had been left with 16 no discretion regarding the manner of implementation, as a result of which these measures should be immune from judicial review. 25 Realizing perhaps that the CJEU was highly unlikely to reverse its position on the lack of immunity of the implementing measures (which it indeed reaffirmed rather summarily), 26 the appellants further attempted to lower the level of scrutiny applied during judicial review. This was inspired by the fact that the EU institutions lacked any margin of discretion in relation to the manner of implementing the measures stemming from the Al Qaida sanctions regime. 27 However, this argument failed to impress the court which retained its high level of scrutiny in reviewing and striking down the reasons submitted by the EU organs in relation to Mr. Kadi's listing.
11. The current contribution will proceed with an overview of the benchmarks for judicial protection that were endorsed in Kadi (CJEU II). It will also indicate how these benchmarks were applied in the Kadi (CJEU II) case, as this was the first time that the CJEU engaged in a thorough review of the reasons for listing. The contribution will however not revisit the reasoning of the previous Kadi decisions, which have been extensively analyzed elsewhere. 28 Instead, it will thereafter focus on the different techniques applied by the CJEU and the ECtHR, in order to ensure judicial protection for individuals whose human rights are curtailed by decisions of the UNSC.
12. Whereas the CJEU relied exclusively on its own internal legal order for providing judicial protection to the affected individuals or entities, the ECtHR resorted to the technique of harmonious interpretation. This technique is otherwise known as the principle of systemic integration and is also concretized in Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969. This sub-article determines that when interpreting a treaty, account shall be taken of 'any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.' 29 By applying this technique, the courts in question attempted to reconcile apparent contradictory obligations stemming from a UNSC resolution on the one hand, and international human rights standards on the other. 13. The contribution will further assess the implications of these techniques, as the differences between them can have consequences for the efficacy of UNSC sanctions regimes. In addition, they can impact the role and relevance of international law in sustaining a balance between human rights and international peace and security. 25 See also Tzanakopoulos, supra note 17, at sec. II. 26 Kadi (CJEU II), supra note 1, at paras. 59-69. 27 Kadi (CJEU II), supra note 1, at paras. 72-73; Tzanakopoulos, supra note 17, at sec. IV. A similar (ultimately unsuccessful) line of reasoning was suggested by Advocate-General Bot in his opinion to the CJEU regarding Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C- 595 
II. The benchmarks for judicial protection within the EU legal order
14. In the Kadi (CJEU II) decision of July 2013, the CJEU reaffirmed that fundamental rights, one of which is judicial protection, formed an integral part of the general and constitutional principles of the EU. These principles, could not be prejudiced by an international agreement, be it the United Nations Charter or otherwise, despite the fact that the treaty in question maintains its primacy under international law. 30 The CJEU further reiterated the benchmarks of judicial protection which had to be respected by those organs of the EU which are responsible for the implementation and execution of the respective UNSC targeted sanctions regime on behalf of EU member states. In essence, these benchmarks rest on two pillars, namely the right to be heard vis-à-vis the EU authorities, such as the Council of the EU and judicial review involving the EU courts. 31 
II.A. The right to be heard
15. Within the EU legal order the right to be heard applies to all decisions that can culminate in a measure adversely affecting the person in question. In relation to targeted sanctions it would first require that the competent EU authority provides the listed persons with a statement of reasons for listing or maintaining their listing. Thereafter the listed persons must be provided with the opportunity to make their views known. Finally, the competent EU authority must examine carefully and impartially the soundness of the reasons, considering also the rebuttals of the affected person and any exculpatory evidence. 32 16. A particular bone of contention remains the scope of the statement of reasons to be given to the listed individuals. According to the CJEU, this statement has to be sufficiently specific and concrete in relation to the individual in question. It has to give a concrete indication as to why a specific individual was listed. 33 The CJEU accepted that not all evidence needed to be disclosed 34 and that a summary of reasons, such as that provided by the Al Qaida sanctions committee, could suffice. 35 However, the decisive point is that the listed individuals must be in a position to make known their views effectively in relation to the grounds advanced against them. They must be able to decide, with full knowledge of the relevant facts, whether there is any point in bringing an action before the EU courts. 36 17. The respective competent EU authority has to consider also exculpatory evidence provided by the listed individual. In order to enable it to engage in a careful and impartial assessment of all the facts, 30 Kadi (CJEU II) supra note 1, at para. 97. 31 Ibid., at paras. 98-99. 32 Ibid., at paras. 100, 135. 33 Ibid., at para. the relevant EU authority may need to request the Al Qaida sanctions committee to disclose to it confidential or other relevant information in its possession. Similarly, the EU authority may need to request the Al Qaida sanctions committee to assist it in obtaining such information from the particular United Nations member state which proposed the listing. 37 The CJEU based this obligation on the principle of effective cooperation embodied in Article 220(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which governs the relationship between the EU and the United Nations in matters of international peace and security. 38 18. By underscoring the importance of the information in possession of the Al Qaida sanctions committee and United Nations member states, the CJEU implicitly acknowledged that the EU organs are often dependant on this information in order to make an informed decision. Yet, the CJEU also implicitly acknowledged that the Al Qaida sanctions committee or other United Nations member states are under no obligation to share the relevant (and often confidential) evidence with the competent EU authority.
The CJEU determined that the mere fact that an EU authority does not make accessible to the listed persons (or subsequently to the EU courts) evidence that is in the sole possession of a sanctions committee or a United Nations member state, does not in and of itself amount to a violation of the right to judicial protection. 39 However, the matter does not end there, for there remains an obligation on the EU authorities to provide the necessary evidence themselves. If they are not able to do so, the EU courts will have to exercise their review on the basis of that information that is available to them. If that material is insufficient for determining that a reason for listing is well-founded in relation to the individual in question, such reasons cannot be relied on as the basis for the listing. 40 19. It is worth nothing that the Kadi (CJEU II) decision left intact previous decisions pertaining to the timing of the right to be heard. In accordance with previous jurisprudence of the EU courts, this right is triggered only after the listing (and subsequent freezing of assets) have occurred. Once an individual or entity has been listed, the reasons for doing so must be communicated as soon as possible. Similarly, it is not necessary that states first institute and await the outcome of criminal proceedings prior to participating in the listing of individuals in their territory. 41 37 Ibid., at paras. 114-115. 38 Ibid., at para. 115. See also Art. 20(1), Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union, O.J. C 115/47 (May 5, 2009). 39 The CJEU noted that the General Court erred in Kadi (GC II), supra note 1, at paras. 181, 183-184, when determining that the lack of access of a listed individual or the EU courts to information which an EU organ does not have in its possession, as such constituted a violation of the right to judicial protection. See Kadi (CJEU II) supra note 1, at para. 139; Tzanakopoulos, supra note 17, at sec. IV. 40 Kadi (CJEU II), supra note 1, at paras. 120-124; 137; Tzanakopoulos, supra note 17, at sec. IV. 41 See inter alia Kadi (CJEU I), supra note 1, at para 339. The position of the EU courts can be distinguished from that of the Human Rights Committee , 1999) , without awaiting the outcome of the national criminal investigation, Belgium was responsible for the resulting infringement of their right to liberty of movement as protected by Article 12 ICCPR. As a result of the listing the couple was not allowed to travel within or leave Belgium. However, the approach suggested by the HRC would compromise the purpose of the listing procedure which is aimed at swift and effective action.
II.B. The right to judicial review
20. The second pillar of judicial protection within the EU legal order concerns the right to judicial review before the General Court and the CJEU -a right that applies regardless of whether the freezing of assets amounts to a criminal charge. 42 For this review to be meaningful, the European courts must be placed in a position to determine whether the EU authority responsible for the listing has carefully applied its mind to all the relevant facts; whether the facts actually support the conclusions drawn by that authority, and whether the EU authorities have given sufficient consideration to any exculpatory evidence.
This implies that the provision of a statement of reasons for the listing is not only a crucial element of a fair hearing before the competent EU authorities, but also essential for enabling the respective EU court to verify the factual accuracy of the reasons underpinning the listing. 43 21. When engaging in such a verification, the court cannot restrict itself to an abstract assessment of the reasons relied on, but needs to determine whether at least one of the reasons is substantiated by evidence that directly relates to the listed person concerned. The need for substantiated evidence is necessitated by the procedural rights of the listed individual during an adversarial process. This in turn implies that at least one of the reasons must be sufficiently detailed and specific in order to serve as basis for the listing. This also applies in situations where some of the nature and sources of evidence may be withheld for security reasons, or where disclosure of evidence takes the form of a summary of reasons. 44 22. In applying these criteria to the summary of reasons provided by the Al Qaida sanctions committee in relation to Mr. Kadi, the CJEU found four of the five reasons sufficiently detailed and specific. However, none of these reasons were substantiated by evidence and in all instances Mr. Kadi 2, 2009 ). However, in Kadi (GC II), supra note 1, at para. 150, the General Court cautioned that measures which have been in place for more than ten years can hardly be described as temporary and precautionary. See also Kadi (CJEU II), supra note 1, at para. 132. 43 Kadi (CJEU II), supra note 1, at para. 119; Kadi (GC II), supra note 1, at paras. 89, 93, 143, 145. 44 Ibid., at para. 119 ff. 45 Ibid., at para. 143. 46 Ibid., at paras. 151, 153. 26. Finally, the last reason submitted in the summary of reasons already failed the first hurdle of specificity. According to the summary provided by the Al Qaida sanctions committee, Mr. Kadi had been the owner of several Albania firms which directed money to extremists and which received working capital from Usama bin Laden. The allegation was insufficiently detailed, as it gave no indication of the 47 Ibid., at para. 156. 48 Ibid., at para. 144-145, 154. 49 Ibid., at paras. 156-157. 50 Ibid., at paras. 148-149. 51 Ibid., at para. 162. identity of the firms or extremists concerned, nor the timing of the alleged conduct. 52 In essence therefore, none of the allegations presented against Mr Kadi in the summary provided by the Al Qaida sanctions committee were such as to justify the adoption, at EU level, of restrictive measures against him. Even to the extent that the reasons provided were sufficiently specific, they remained unsubstantiated in the face of detailed rebuttals submitted by Mr. Kadi. 53 28. This resolution required states to adopt various measures for the purpose of combating international terrorism. However, it did not provide a UNSC sanctions committee with the competence to engage in direct listing or de-listing of individuals for the purpose of assets freezing or imposing travel bans. Instead, it left states (or regional organizations that act on their behalf) with a broad discretion in determining their own listing procedures in accordance with their respective legal systems. The CJEU nonetheless applied similar levels of judicial protection in relation to the implementing measures stemming from these different regimes. This effectively amounts to a rejection of different levels of judicial protection within the EU, depending on the degree of discretion that the wording of a UNSC sanctions regime provided for in relation to its implementation. This undoubtedly places EU member states -which are all also members of the United Nations -in a difficult position. They are forced to disobey either a decision of the CJEU or a UNSC resolution, which will trigger state responsibility under either the one or the other regime. 56 29. Be that as it may, judicial deference by the European courts to the listing and de-listing procedures of UNSC sanctions committees will remain unlikely, until such a time as the sanctions committee in question provides independent judicial protection. This can be concluded from the statement by the CJEU that judicial review by the EU courts remain essential since, despite the improvements added to the 52 Ibid., at para. 141. 53 Ibid., at para. 163. 54 32. In addition, the CJEU's approach leads to a situation of legal uncertainty ('limping situations'), due to the fact that its decisions for annulment are binding on the EU authorities, but not on the UNSC or any of its (sub-)organs. The EU courts do not have the judicial competence to order the UNSC or its sanctions committees to de-list any particular individual, nor to introduce effective judicial protection at the international level. Therefore, while the European courts can order the competent EU authorities not to give effect to a particular listing by a UNSC sanctions committee, the listing will formally remain intact at the UNSC level. This will remain the case until such a time as the UNSC sanctions committee itself delists the affected individual or entity.
II.C. Assessing the judicial technique applied by the CJEU

The
III. Human rights friendly interpretation of UNSC Resolutions in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR
A question that arises from the above analysis is if and to what extent the systemic challenges
resulting from the dualist technique applied by the CJEU can be overcome by the technique of harmonious (human rights friendly) interpretation followed by the ECtHR. The subsequent paragraphs will examine the implications of the two leading cases in this regard, namely Al Jedda v the United Kingdom 59 and Nada. Whereas the former case concerned the interpretation of a UNSC resolution that left states with some discretion in terms of its method of implementation, hardly any such discretion was available in relation to the UNSC measures applicable to Mr. Nada. 60 38. In essence therefore, it seems that it is unlikely that the ECtHR will accept any intention on the part of the UNSC to deviate from international human rights obligations of member states, unless this is required in so many words by a UNSC resolution itself. 69 Where this is not the case states will have to prove that they have indeed done everything in their power to prevent the suspension of their international human rights obligations, when giving effect to UNSC obligations. 70 How difficult this task can be, even in instances where the UNSC resolution leaves significantly less scope for interpretation than was the case with UNSC Resolution 1546 (2004), can be illustrated by the Nada case. As mentioned in the introductory section above, Mr. Nada was listed by the Al Qaida sanctions committee in accordance with the UNSC Resolution 1267 (1999) sanctions regime. However, due to the fact the implementing measures in question were adopted by Switzerland which is not in the EU, any review of the legality of these measures had to be undertaken by Swiss courts. 69 Al-Jedda (ECtHR), supra note 59, at para. 102. 70 The position of the ECtHR in Al Jedda was also echoed in the separate opinion of Sir Nigel Rodley in the Sayadi & Vinck decision of the HRC, supra note 41. He argued that the over-arching criterion for interpretation was the presumption that the UNSC did not intend actions pursuant to its resolutions that violated international human rights standards. 71 Nada (Swiss Federal Tribunal), supra note 15. 72 . Ibid. obtain an exemption from the implementing measures at the domestic level, which amounted to a violation of Article 13(1) ECHR. 77 In coming to this conclusion the ECtHR made a curt reference to the Kadi (CJEU I) decision and also noted that de-listing procedure at the United Nations level did not amount to an effective remedy. 78 Moreover, it claimed that there was nothing in the Resolution 1267 the one resulting from Resolution 1267 (1999) necessarily and implicitly allows states the discretion needed to enforce the respective sanctions regime in accordance with international human rights standards.
III.A. Interpreting flexible UNSC Resolutions
III.B. Interpreting inflexible UNSC Resolutions
45. Such an interpretation would amount to assuming the permissibility of judicial review in accordance with the standards of the ECHR (or other applicable international human rights instruments), unless this was explicitly excluded. In practice, this would place implementing states and the affected individuals and entities in a similar situation of legal uncertainty, as would result from a consistent enforcement of the Kadi (CJEU II) decision. Whereas the individuals would regain access to their assets and freedom of movement within a particular jurisdiction, they would remain formally listed ('targeted') at the United Nations level, until such as time as the respective sanctions committee de-listed them.
Furthermore, states which delisted individuals on the domestic level subsequent to a court decision to this effect may trigger state responsibility on the international level for acting in contravention with a UNSC obligation. In the case of Mr. Nada these two consequences will not arise, as he has since also been de- 
III.C. Assessing the judicial technique applied by the ECtHR
47. The line of reasoning introduced by the ECtHR in Al-Jedda and continued in Nada, reflects that ECHR member states are under an obligation to show that it has done as much as possible to prevent a disproportionate limitation of ECHR standards by a particular UNSC resolution. This includes a stringent requirement for motivating why a state had not chosen less restrictive means of implementation. The more latitude the language of a UNSC resolution leaves a state for implementation, the more difficult it would be to justify a method of implementation that restricts human rights. However, the Nada decision of the ECtHR has indicated that even where the language of a UNSC resolution leaves no apparent scope for interpretation, states remain under an obligation to find a way to give some effect to international human rights standards. The presumption that the UNSC did not intend to deviate from human rights standards seems to be almost irrebuttable, even where it would amount to a distortion of the text of a UNSC decision.
48. The great advantage of the technique of systemic integration is that it finds a solution for conflicts between international obligations within the international legal order itself and thereby strengthens the unity of international law. 84 In the Al-Jedda and Nada cases, the technique prevented an open rejection of UNSC resolutions by individual states, which could result in undermining a unified system for the protection of international peace and security. This risk is inherent in the dualist approach followed by the CJEU in the Kadi cases, since it regards international law as irrelevant for deciding the norm conflict. When applying the technique of systemic integration on the other hand, states remain bound to give effect to UNSC resolutions even though the scope of these obligations is limited by human rights obligations through interpretation. Systemic integration therefore reduces the risk of an open rebellion against and destabilization of the United Nations system for the protection of international peace and security. Stated differently, systematic integration contributes to the unity of the international legal order and serves as a counter-force against fragmentation of international law.
49. Even so, one has to concede that the technique is only convincing where it does not lead to a distortion of the text of the competing international obligations at stake. The Al-Jedda decision exemplifies a case where the technique was applied convincingly, i.e. in a manner that did not contradict the text of the UNSC resolution. The texts of the relevant resolution was sufficiently flexible to allow for the interpretation chosen by the ECtHR. The Nada decision on the other hand, would amount to an overstretching of the technique. It effectively distorted the wording of a UNSC sanctions regime and can result in the same type of 'limping scenarios' that can potentially result from the reasoning in the Kadi decisions.
In essence, the Nada decision is not so much an illustration of harmonious interpretation as an example of 
